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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE STRUGGLE TO BURY PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
CONSIDERATION
SALLIE THIEME SANFORD*
I. INTRODUCTION
As of January 1, 2014, applicants for comprehensive health insurance
do not face questions about their health history. The Affordable Care Act
(ACA) prohibits health insurers from considering an individual’s health
history in determining whether to sell that person a comprehensive health
insurance policy, the policy’s price, or its coverage terms.1 Pre-existing
condition (PEC) consideration is, in this crucial context, dead. Few will
mourn its passing. This legislative milestone marks a significant step towards
the goal of a healthier population.
While celebrating this achievement, however, we ought to recall the
context of PEC consideration, its practical application, and its continuing
potential to infect other aspects of healthcare coverage. The “struggle for
the soul of health insurance” continues.2 With the ACA’s reliance on private
insurance, albeit under a much different regulatory framework, competitive
pressures to favor the healthy will persist. Moreover, enforcement of the new
regulatory framework will be hampered by the ACA’s complex and
contentious federalism dance. Vigilance will be required to ensure that those
made vulnerable by illness or injury are not further disadvantaged by other
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law, Adjunct Assistant Professor,
University of Washington Department of Health Services sanfords@u.washington.edu. I am
grateful to Rebecca Leah Levine, M.P.H., J.D., and Caitlin Forsyth for their research
assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(Mar. 23, 2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42
U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA]. See also Katie Keith, Kevin Lucia & Christine Monahan,
Nondiscrimination under the Affordable Care Act, CENTER ON HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS,
GEORGETOWN U. HEALTH POL’Y INST., 8-9 (July 2013), http://chir.georgetown.edu/pdfs/Non
discriminationUndertheACA_GeorgetownCHIR.pdf (discussing a number of the ACA’s other
nondiscrimination provisions relating to health insurance such as mandated essential health
benefits coverage requirements, elimination of lifetime coverage limits and expanded civil
rights protections).
2. Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 287, 287 (1993).
405
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key aspects of insurance, such as coverage exclusions, benefit decisions,
and provider networks. Access to health insurance is only the beginning.
II. THE HISTORIC TENSION BETWEEN ACTUARIAL FAIRNESS AND SOLIDARITY
Insurance access has historically included barriers for those with a
variety of medical conditions. As Deborah Stone details in her seminal 1993
article The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, the logic of “actuarial
fairness” — people paying for their own risk — developed as an inherent
part of the competitive markets for health insurance.3 It also resonates with
social divisions and individualistic philosophies that remain prominent in
American society. Its practical application involved medical underwriting,
including, in some markets, individual questionnaires to find “the best and
most desirable insureds.”4
Stone contrasts this with the “solidarity principle” that accepts sickness as
“a condition that should trigger mutual aid” and presumes risk pooling
within the community as broadly conceived.5 Although the end of the last
century saw increasing political pressure to restrain underwriting, Stone
concludes that the embedded nature of actuarial fairness will make it
extremely hard to eradicate.6
In terms of what constituted a PEC for purposes of health insurance,
varied definitions have been used over the years in statutes and insurance
contracts. Under one type of definitional framework, coverage could be
denied for medical conditions for which a person had actually received a
diagnosis or treatment prior to applying for coverage.7 Another framework
allowed consideration of undiagnosed conditions that caused symptoms for
which a prudent person would have sought treatment.8
The ACA’s PEC protections did not spring up sui generis in the 111th
Congress. There has long been legislative concern regarding the perversity
of health insurance being denied to some precisely because they are likely

3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 292–300.
Id. at 294 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 289–92.
Id. at 290. See also TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE HEALTH
INSURANCE, 1-5 (2009), available at http://www.nasi.org/usr_doc/The_Regulation_of_Pri
vate_Health_Insurance.pdf (discussing particular challenges and structural tensions in the
health insurance context, including its market dynamics).
7. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS: PRE-EXISTING CONDITION
EXCLUSIONS, 2-3 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/01/8356.pdf. See also Jennifer M. Franco, Undermining the Protection of Health
Insurance: The Preexisting Condition Clause, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 883, 887 (1996).
8. See Jennifer M. Franco, supra note 7, at 886 (citing Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing
and Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507, 521 (1991)). See also KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., supra note 7, at 2.
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to need it. States, the traditional regulators of insurance, particularly on the
individual market, addressed pieces of the problem, with significant
variation among the states.9 For example, some states allowed insurers to
permanently exclude coverage for a PEC;10 others limited the exclusion
timeframe to a matter of months or years.11 Some states limited how much
more someone could be charged based on a PEC or other factors such as
age or tobacco use;12 others created high risk pools for those denied
coverage, and defined the PEC circumstances that could land a person
there.13
Federal laws addressed pieces of the problem. The federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, for example,
reduced the applicability of PEC consideration in the employer-provided
insurance context.14 It also provided some protection from PEC exclusions
on the individual market — but only for those who had had qualifying group
coverage and then “COBRA’ed” it for as long as allowed. Depending on
the state, the offered coverage might be within a high risk pool, typically an
expensive option.15 Another federal law, the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, expands HIPAA’s prohibition on using genetic

9. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 7, at 2-5 (summarizing state approaches to PEC
exclusions). See generally, JOST, supra note 6 (discussing historic and evolving roles of state
and federal regulation in health insurance).
10. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2209f(a) (2009).
11. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22.605.1(4)(a) (2005).
12. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.025(3) (2012).
13. See generally, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., PUB. NO. 8328, HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKET REFORMS: RATE RESTRICTIONS (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2013/01/8328.pdf (collecting information regarding various state
approaches). See also JOST, supra note 6, at 18 (discussing types and impacts of small group
and individual market underwriting and rating reforms).
14. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.).
15. See Jessica Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to
Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1181 (2012) (discussing
HIPAA’s significant practical limitations). The federal law popularly known as COBRA requires
most, but not all group plans to provide a temporary continuation of health insurance
coverage that would otherwise be lost due to certain events (such as job loss or divorce). The
length of coverage varies between 18 – 36 months and the beneficiary may be charged up to
102 percent of the total premium cost, a prohibitive amount for many, particularly those who
are eligible precisely because they have lost their jobs. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); Fact Sheet, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fscobra.html (last visited
Apr. 2, 2014).
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information in medical underwriting; it does not prohibit consideration of
manifest genetically linked conditions.16
This patchwork of federal and state laws left many dangling between the
threads, unable to get a policy or offered policies with key coverage
exclusions or prohibitively high cost.17 And it did not impact only those with
serious illnesses and injuries; relatively benign conditions could lead to
exclusions and extra costs.18 A substantial portion of Americans faced the
risk of being unable to secure adequate insurance if they lost or never had
employer-provided coverage.19 As a concrete example of the how PEC
consideration functioned, it is worth recalling recent history in a state with
comparatively protective laws in this area.
III. A QUESTIONNAIRE: PEC CONSIDERATION IN ACTION
If you are wondering what can go wrong with a body, the Washington
State Health Insurance Questionnaire is a good place to look. It was
introduced as part of a 2000 legislative package that attempted to revive
the individual market after piecemeal evisceration of comprehensive reform
left it in tatters.20 As part of the package, insurers could impose a ninemonth waiting period for PEC coverage on the individual market, faced few
rate limitations, and could exclude entirely the most expensive patients.
Rejected applicants were then entitled to coverage within the state’s high-risk
pool, which, although subsidized, came with high premiums and high cost
sharing in addition to waiting periods for PEC coverage.21 As with the

16. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). See also
Roberts, supra note 15, at 1184.
17. See SARA ROSENBAUM, INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HEALTH STATUS: AN
OVERVIEW OF DISCRIMINATION PRACTICES, FEDERAL LAW, AND FEDERAL REFORM OPTIONS (2009),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/2009/rwjf36943 (arguing that these
and other laws, while laudable, provide “relatively limited protections”).
18. See Jennifer M. Franco, supra note 7, at 901.
19. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: June 2013, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (June 19, 2013),
http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-june-2013/ (showing
2013 survey data that states 49 percent of adults under age 65 say they or someone in their
household has a pre-existing condition, and many of them report problems related to getting
and keeping insurance).
20. See Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in
Washington, Kentucky, and Massachusetts, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 133-40 (2000);
Sallie Thieme Sanford, Mind the Gap: Basic Health Along the ACA’s Coverage Continuum,
MD. J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2014) (describing Washington State’s
comprehensive health reform efforts in the early 1990s).
21. Act of Mar. 23, 2000, ch. 79, 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 413, 425, 428 (codified as
amended in scattered sections the WASH. REV. CODE). See also Amanda Cassidy, Pre-Existing
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medical underwriting examples from the early 1990s provided in Stone’s
article, this tool provides a concrete description of one form of risk
consideration in the health insurance marketplace.
The questionnaire, which remained substantially the same through
2013, was designed to identify the most expensive patients, the roughly
eight percent of individual insurance applicants the companies could reject
entirely.22 Those who were “HIPAA-eligible” — basically those who were
covered under an employer-sponsored plan that they continued for the
maximum allowed time under COBRA — and some others23 were exempt
from the questionnaire and the prospect of individual insurance denial. All
others who wanted individual insurance in the state had to fill out the
questionnaire.24 Those whose scores reached a certain number could be —
and would be — denied coverage and allowed to join the state’s high-risk
pool.25
The questionnaire exceeded 25 pages, with more than 200 medical
conditions grouped within 11 categories (circulatory problems, digestive
issues, skeletal malfunctions and more).26 Each medical condition had a
point value attached, and the total score determined eligibility for individual
insurance.27 The scoring sheet was available online, and the threshold score
number was set for some time at 325.28
Each of the 36 conditions listed on the first two pages was scored at
325.29 The questionnaire did not explicitly say that, but it did allow that if
you had checked any of them you “may choose to answer” the remaining
sections or may simply skip to the end.30 Included in this alphabetically listed
group were AIDS, cystic fibrosis, necrotizing fasciitis, and pulmonary heart

Condition Insurance Plan, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (June 11, 2011), http://health
affairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_47.pdf.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.41.060 (2012).
23. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.41.060 (2012), amended by S.B. 6412, 62nd Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2012).
24. Id.
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.41.100 (2012); WASH. STATE HEALTH INS. POOL, STANDARD
HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WASHINGTON STATE 1, 1 (2012), available at https://www.wship.
org/Docs/SHQ%20Revised%2004%203%202012%20Final%20Post.pdf (last updated Mar.
23, 2012) [hereinafter QUESTIONNAIRE]. For rules, see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 182-23-010,
182-23-020, 182-23-060, 284-43-975, 284-43-985 (2014).
26. QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 25, at l8-25.
27. Scoring for the Standard Health Questionnaire for Washington State, Use for
Individual Coverage Beginning on or after October 1, 2009, WASH. STATE HEALTH INS. POOL,
https://www.wship.org/Docs/SHQ%20Point%20Scores%20Final%20%20Condition%20Num
bers.pdf (last updated May 12, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1-2.
30. Standard Health Questionnaire for Washington State, supra note 25, at 9.
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disease. There were also 325-pointers scattered throughout the other
sections; this group included many malignancies.31
The automatically disqualifying conditions changed over time as
treatments evolved. For example, the inclusion of multiple sclerosis was tied
to the availability of medications that slow the disease’s progression and
that come with a wholesale price of as much as $48,000 a year.32 The
questionnaire’s lowest-scoring condition, coming in at one point, was
having had jaundice as an infant (last 12 months). 33 This part of the
questionnaire faded away in 2010, as the ACA’s prohibition on PEC for
children’s health insurance coverage went into effect.34
As a parlor game, one could try to amass a collection of relatively
common and benign conditions to see if the score can reach 325. Nasal
polyp (last 12 months), eczema, insomnia, depression (last 5 years), flu
(treated by physician), food allergies, erectile dysfunction (if mental), and
high cholesterol add up to 325.35 A recent history of tennis elbow, migraine
headache, kidney stones, yeast infection, and restless leg syndrome would
also suffice.
IV. THE CHALLENGES OF BURYING PEC CONSIDERATION
As of January 1, 2014, applicants for health insurance do not have to
fill out this questionnaire. The ACA forbids it.36 Whether applying for health
insurance coverage through individual or group markets, people cannot be
denied coverage or charged more because of their health status.37 The
currently healthy do not get the advantage of paying less in premiums, and
the currently sick do not face the disadvantage of paying more.38
In this sense, the individual market comes closer to the operation of the
employer-provided insurance market. In addition, the package of “essential
health benefits” to be offered includes coverage — such as maternity care

31. Scoring for the Standard Health Questionnaire for Washington State, supra note 27.
32. K. Noyes et al., Cost-effectiveness of Disease-modifying Therapy for Multiple
Sclerosis: A Population-based Study, 77 NEUROLOGY 355, 359 (2011).
33. Scoring for Standard Health Questionnaire for Washington State, supra note 27, at 7.
34. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S PRE-EXISTING HEALTH CONDITIONS
(2014).
35. Scoring for Standard Health Questionnaire for Washington State, supra note 27, at 27. See also Kyung M. Song, Simpler Health Questionnaire may Complicate Insurance, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2008, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2004123942_healthsurvey
14m.html.
36. See ACA § 1501 (2010).
37. Id.
38. Of course, those with greater healthcare needs are likely to end up paying more in
out-of-pocket costs. Additionally, the overall rates paid by a covered group are impacted by
the healthcare expenses of those who make up the group.
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and mental health treatment — that has not been readily available on the
individual market and that targets conditions with distinct societal impacts.
Where allowed by state law, rates can vary on the individual market based
on tobacco use (with tobacco users charged up to 50 percent more than
non-users) and age (with older people charged up to three times as much
as young people).39 While these provisions certainly reflect consideration of
actuarial fairness and an effort to maintain financial viability of the private
market, the ACA’s overall approach moves the country decisively towards
the solidarity principle of insurance.40
Among those who know about them, the ACA’s PEC prohibitions are
among its most popular aspects. A March 2012 New York Times/CBS poll
found eighty-five percent approved of the “provision in the 2010 health care
law that requires health insurance companies to cover those who may have
an existing medical condition or prior illness.”41 In an expression of the
tension highlighted by Deborah Stone decades ago, however, this coverage
requirement is also cited as unfair to the young and healthy. An anti-ACA
advertisement aimed at young people, for example, argues that the young
will unfairly pay higher premiums: “Sure, you work out, stay healthy. But,
come on brah, someone’s got to pay for people who smoke, drink 85
ounce sodas, and live in Barcaloungers.”42 Key questions for the insurance
exchanges going forward will be the claims status of their risk pools and the
resulting costs of unsubsidized insurance. This is a primary reason why

39. ACA § 1201, adding Public Health Service Act (PHSA) § 2701 (codified at § 42
U.S.C. 300gg) (2010). See also Overview: Final Rule for Health Insurance Market Reforms,
CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Re
sources/Files/Downloads/market-rules-technical-summary-2-27-2013.pdf.
40. Jessica Roberts argues that these and other aspects of the ACA approximate health
status, and thus continue disadvantaging the same populations as the prior system. “Thus,
while the Affordable Care Act may end health-status discrimination on its face it will not in its
effect.” Roberts, supra note 15, at 1160.
41. CBS News/New York Times Poll, Mar. 21-25, 2012, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/27/us/03272012_polling_doc.html. In one
indication about the confusion about the law, a January 2014 Kaiser Foundation poll found
that about half of those surveyed did not know whether the ACA “[p]rohibit[s] insurance
companies from denying coverage because of a person’s medical history.” Kaiser Health
Tracking Poll: January 2014, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 30, 2014), http://kff.org/healthreform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-january-2014/.
42. Crossroads GPS, Crossroads GPS: Propaganda, YOUTUBE (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfP6LmJiSec&list=UUZtZuLHzPSeodii1DhtQzWA&feature
=c4-overview. See also Stone, supra note 2, at 287 (discussing a health insurance ad that
includes the statement: “If you don’t take risks, why should you pay for someone else’s?”).
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reports on enrollment numbers break down the enrollees by age group, as a
proxy for health status.43
The ACA’s insurance reforms aim not only to increase coverage but
also, by facilitating apples-to-apples comparison, to encourage competition
on quality and price.44 Given the reality of price competition, though,
market pressures to favor the healthy are likely to persist. Those pressures
could play out in other key aspects of insurance.45
An area of concern relates to the networks of providers (including,
particularly, physicians and hospitals) offered by the health insurance plans
on the new Exchanges or Marketplaces. In 2014, they seem to be generally
narrow, or limited, compared to the broader networks typically offered by
employer-sponsored plans.46 Narrow networks can hold down costs, and
thus premiums, supporting the goal of affordability.47 They could also deter
selection by those who need care for serious or chronic conditions,
disadvantaging the unhealthy. How will regulators approach a situation in
which, for example, a child is born with a congenital heart disease but the
network does not include a pediatric cardiologist?48 As the Marketplaces
evolve over time, regulators will need to monitor network adequacy, not
only in terms of numbers of providers, but also types of providers.
Another area of potential concern relates to coverage exclusions and
delays for medical treatment as well as for medications.49 One reason for
this concern is that the Marketplace plans are based on “benchmark plans”
43. See Health Insurance Marketplace: January Enrollment Report, DEPT. OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANCE SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2014/MarketPlaceEnrollment/Jan2014/ib_2014jan_en
rollment.pdf.
44. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Detailed Summary, DEMOCRATIC
POLICY & COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, http://www.dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/healthbill
04.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
45. See Keith, Lucia & Monahan, supra note 1 (detailing areas of potential concern, and
the challenges of defining, monitoring and enforcing the ACA’s nondiscrimination standards).
See also Rosenbaum, supra note 46, at 2 (written prior to the ACA’s passage, setting out
areas of concern and how they might be addressed under various reform proposals).
46. Robert Pear, Lower Health Insurance Premiums to Come at Cost of Fewer Choices,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/health/
lower-health-insurance-premiums-to-come-at-cost-of-fewer-choices.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
47. Id.
48. This example is included in the Georgetown report based on interviews with
regulators and advocates. See Keith, Lucia & Monahan, supra note 1, at 11.
49. See SABRINA CORLETTE ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: CHOOSING AN ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BENCHMARK PLAN (2013),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/
2013/Mar/1677_Corlette_implementing_ACA_choosing_essential_hlt_benefits_reform_
brief.pdf.
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sold in the state prior to the ACA’s enactment.50 Updating a benchmark
plan to include the required ten essential benefits is relatively straightforward
compared to addressing the “gray areas” of benefit design such as
exclusions and visit limits.51
Utilization review practices also hold a potential for inappropriate
discrimination. Utilization review is a process by which insurers decide on a
case-by-case basis whether to cover, or continue to cover, a particular
treatment.52 While the ACA creates more standardized independent review
options for these decisions, the burden of challenging a utilization review
decision rests largely with the patient, or the patient’s family.53 The new
appeal rights are extremely valuable but might not be the best way to
identify problematic practices on a systemic basis.
Vigilance will be required to ensure that those made vulnerable by
illness or injury are not further disadvantaged by these and other aspects of
insurance coverage. Enforcement and monitoring of the ACA’s health
insurance reforms will be complicated, however. There is as of yet little
federal guidance on the practical meaning of the ACA’s nondiscrimination
requirements.54 What benefit design features perpetuate discrimination now
disallowed by the ACA? How can regulators and others identify them?
In addition, this is one of the many areas of the law that involves a
complex and contentious federalism dance.55 The regulation of health
insurers and of commercial insurance has historically been a state function.
The ACA presumed that most states would run their own insurance

50. Noam M. Levey, Passing the Buck – Or Empowering States? Who Will Define Essential
Health Benefits, 4 HEALTH AFF. 663, 665 (2012).
51. Keith, Lucia & Monahan, supra note 1, at 11, 13, 14 (reflecting statements of
interviewed regulators).
52. Arlene Weintraub, Insurer Mounts Offensive and Defensive Strategies on Health Law,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2010/august/
16/cigna-top-executives-response-to-health-law.aspx.
53. Keith, Lucia & Monahan., supra note 1, at 15 (discussing practical challenges to
bringing an appeal).
54. Id. at 15-16 (discussing possible forms of guidance and issues to be addressed).
55. Another key area, of course, is in the ACA’s expansion of the joint federal-state
Medicaid programs to cover citizens with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level.
As written, the ACA presumes that all states would expand Medicaid; following the Supreme
Court’s decision making this expansion optional, many have declined to do so, at least
beginning in 2014. See generally KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATUS OF STATE ACTION ON THE
MEDICAID EXPANSION DECISION (2014), available at http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator
/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/ (showing that
roughly half of the states have not elected to expand Medicaid as of January 2014); Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012). KAISER FAMILY FOUND., A
GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION (2012) available
at http://kaiserfamily foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf.
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Marketplaces.56 Most have declined to do so, at least for the first year, and
deferred to the fallback position of a federally facilitated exchange.57 If
states fail to monitor compliance with the ACA’s insurance regulations, or
actively decline to enforce them, will the federal government have the
resources and expertise to do so? Will advocacy groups take up the
challenge? These are some of the many ACA implementation questions
highlighted by the ongoing political opposition to the law.
PEC consideration in health insurance issuance is gone. This and other
aspects of the ACA’s insurance reforms take a decisive and much needed
step away from the logic of actuarial fairness and toward the principle of
social solidarity. That principle will be tested, however, by the ACA’s
allowable rating features and by market pressures to favor the healthy in
other aspects of coverage. It will also be tested by the ACA’s complex
overlap of federal and state authority. The struggle for the soul of health
insurance continues, as does the overarching struggle to ensure robust
access to healthcare for all.

56. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATE DECISIONS FOR CREATING HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKETPLACES (2014), available at http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/health-in
surance-exchanges.
57. See id. (showing 27 states have federally facilitated exchanges as of May 2013).

